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  In the U.S., public agencies and some private landowners conduct wildlife management 
(Messmer et. al. 1998). Old and new challenges complicate their task. First, unfettered wildlife 
territories do not often coincide with land ownership. Fences that force wildlife to respect 
property boundaries are costly to erect and reduce how much humans value their existence. 
Second, recreational and environmental groups, less interested in specific game species, have 
emerged as important wildlife users. Fulfilling their demands is difficult because the users are 
dispersed and hard to identify and because the scale of managing a community of species is 
much larger (see Szaro et. al. 1998).  
 
  This article frames these challenges as transaction costs. It extends the analysis of 
Lueck (1989; 1991) who views the wildlife department as an institution that mitigates the 
transaction costs of managing transient wildlife. While Lueck focuses on the contracting costs 
facing landowners wishing to profit from fee-hunting, his hypothesis is relevant in the case of 
nongame management. Wildlife agencies, however, are not immune to the transaction costs of 
satisfying nongame demands, especially because bureaucratic incentives and constraints 
conducive to managing game are unlikely to be conducive for nongame management. This 
article describes variation in the organization of wildlife agencies and variation in landowner 
contracting costs and their effects on agency effort and emphasis on nongame management.  
 
The Wildlife Management Problem  
 
  The economic problem of managing wildlife is one of meeting the demands of those 
willing to pay, while taking into account the costs of wildlife management effort, the value of 
alternative resource use, and damages related to abundant wildlife stocks.  
 
  Wildlife species are no longer valued primarily for the meat and fur their carcass 
provides. Today, recreational demand from hunters and nongame users dominates (USFWS 
2001). Hunters are a small group of relatively high value users generally interested in big game 
species such as elk, deer, and antelope. Nongame users are a larger group of relatively low 
value users. They enjoy watching and photographing wildlife as a primary or complementary 
activity to a related outdoor experience. Nongame users may enjoy a single high profile species 
such as wolves or grizzly bears, or they may enjoy a community of low profile species such as 
songbirds and amphibians. A few indicators show that nongame demand is growing in 
prevalence. Participation in bird-watching and membership in groups such as Defenders of 
Wildlife and Audubon Society have grown tremendously since the mid 1980’s, but the total 
number of individual hunting license holders peaked in 1982 (USFWS 2001; Richie 1999; 
Parker 2001).  
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  Managers can maintain abundant, sustained populations of wildlife in order to fulfill user 
demands. To do so, they need to mitigate resource use that competes with wildlife such as 
shopping malls and certain types of agriculture. Managers may also need to conduct research, 
manipulate habitat, and establish and enforce poaching laws. Maintaining wildlife populations, 
then, generates opportunity costs and management effort costs. Wildlife populations also 
impose direct costs on other resources. Deer damage crops and suburban gardens and cause 
traffic accidents. Wolves kill sheep and cattle. Coyotes and foxes raid chicken coops. Bats 
transmit diseases. Other species can be a general nuisance to property, people, and pets. 
 
  One can imagine a first-best level of resources devoted to wildlife. A tract of land, for 
example, would be used to sustain a wolf pack if the willingness-to-pay of wolf advocates 
outweighed the costs o f less development and livestock losses. In order for this first-best 
outcome to occur, however, wildlife managers would need a costless mechanism that enabled 
them to capture all use and existence values attributed to wolves and to perfectly compensate 
those who suffer losses.  
 
Management Institutions and Transaction Costs 
 
  Such a mechanism would exist only in a world of zero transaction costs (Coase 1960). 
Ownership of wildlife would be perfectly defined. Rights would be enforced at zero costs. Those 
who value wildlife would be excluded from consumption unless they paid market prices. These 
conditions do not hold, of course, and the transient nature of wildlife means that the transaction 
costs needed to sustain wildlife populations are potentially high. Private landowners and wildlife 
agencies must overcome a unique set of transaction costs in order to increase the net value of 
wildlife.  
 
Landowner Contracting Costs  
 
Landowners have incentives to accommodate wildlife if they are residual claimants to its 
value. Because wildlife species typically require larger tracts of land for habitat than a single 
landowner can accommodate, however, landowners must contract with each other in order to 
capture their value. Consider Western landowners wishing to profit from elk hunting. Neighbors 
with small landholdings would need to form a cooperative of sorts, agreeing to limit livestock 
grazing, regulate hunting, and perhaps manipulate habitat. Once cooperative terms were 
established, however, each landowner would have incentives to cheat, perhaps by allowing 
more hunting than agreed upon or by shirking on livestock grazing restrictions. Because of 
these incentives created by divided ownership, landowners would expend resources to monitor 
and enforce the terms of the contract (see Barzel 1997; Lueck 1989). 
 
These contracting costs are not necessarily prohibitive. Anderson (1998) lists examples 
of how they have been privately mitigated by innovative contracts, property right technologies, 
and consolidated ownership of land. Yet the costs will be higher, ceteris paribus, when land use 
is heterogeneous, single landholdings are small, and when public land is interspersed among 
private landholdings. When land use is heterogeneous, it will be costly for the separate 
landowners to measure the relative contribution of their land to successful wildlife propagation. 
Knowing this, neighbors will have incentives to shirk on contractual arrangements. When private 
landholdings are small, landowners must contract with several parties in order to secure a tract 
large enough to encompass a stock of wildlife. The expected costs of monitoring and enforcing 
contracts will rise with the number of parties involved. Finally, in the unlikely event that 
politicians overseeing public land agencies  agree to contract with private landowners, the   3
attendant transaction costs could be prohibitive. Contracts with public agencies are likely to be 
inflexible devices that require the approval of numerous interested parties.  
 
Nineteenth century America provides a good example of high landowner transaction 
costs. Land ownership, at that time, consisted primarily of small privately held parcels amidst 
large tracts of un-owned or public land. The territorial requirements of many species were 
simply larger than most single landholdings could accommodate. Many species of migratory 
birds annually migrated across the continent, fish populations inhabited rivers that flowed for 
hundreds of miles, and big game species required thousands of acres to roam. In such an 
environment contracting between several parties (private and governmental) was prohibitively 
costly. Lueck (1989) argues that the game department emerged as an institution that lowered 
the cost of establishing and enforcing property rights to wildlife. Under such a regime, rights to 
wildlife may be enforced at a lower cost because explicit agreement among all landowners is 
not required for the agency to act. 
 
Public Agency Constraints 
 
  Wildlife agencies, however, are an imperfect solution to the landowner contracting 
problem. Their ability to maximize the net value of wildlife is limited by three categories of 
constraints. First, politicians that oversee agencies have incentives to cater to powerful interest 
groups (Peltzman 1976; Becker 1983). Resident hunting groups, for example, pressure 
politicians (and therefore agencies) into keeping resident license fees low. Second, agencies 
are generally not motivated to maximize the difference between wildlife benefits and costs. 
Instead they are more likely to seek s ome combination of larger budgets (Niskanen 1971), 
autonomy (Wilson 1989), and tasks that allow them to increase their human capital (Wilson 
1989; Dewtripont et. al. 1999). Third, even if bureaucrats are (temporarily) rewarded for wealth-
maximizing behavior, long-standing procedural rules constrain their ability to respond quickly 
and effectively to changes in demand and costs.  
 
  These constraints portray the wildlife department as a political beast beleaguered by 
self-interested behavior and “red-tape.” Y et wildlife departments are probably more market 
oriented than most modern bureaucracies. Hunting, fishing, and other user fees still account for 
the majority of agency revenues in most states (WCFA 2001). In addition, most wildlife 
departments have well-defined missions and are designed to serve a narrow, well-defined 
constituency. Because of these factors, the principle-agent link between wildlife users and 
managers is probably clearer than that of other natural resource agencies such as the U.S. 
Forest Service and state environmental protection departments. 
 
  In recent years, however, the link between wildlife user and manager may be eroding. 
The percentage of agency revenues derived from license sales has been declining for over 
twenty years. Many wildlife agencies now receive a substantial proportion of their revenue from 
state general tax dollars (funds derived from sources unrelated to wildlife use) (WCFA 2001). In 
addition, many wildlife departments have been subordinated beneath larger natural resource or 
environmental protection agencies on state governmental hierarchies (Lueck and Parker 2003). 
These wildlife agencies are governed by a much broader mission and a broader range of 




  The efficacy of private and public wildlife management institutions will depend on the 
severity of landowner contracting costs relative to bureaucratic management constraints and   4
vice versa. The efficacy of each institution may also depend on whether hunting or nongame 
wildlife demand dominates. 
 
  If allowed to profit from wildlife, we should expect private management effort to increase 
when landholdings are large, homogeneous, and held by private parties. These propositions are 
obviously relevant in determining whether landowners will capture the consumptive value of 
wildlife – for example, by choosing to grant hunters access for a fee (see Lueck 1991). Although 
less intuitive, they are also relevant in determining whether landowners will act to capture 
nongame values. In order to make a profit, however, landowners would need to collect revenues 
from a largely dispersed group of low value users and somehow limit visual access from those 
who have not paid. The contracting costs of achieving this arrangement are likely to be higher 
than those associated with fee hunting.  
 
  When landowner contracting costs are high, wildlife agencies have a comparative 
advantage in establishing and enforcing hunting restrictions (Lueck 1989). This advantage is 
diminished, however, to the extent that a wildlife agency is not designed to primarily service 
hunting constituencies. Relative to private landowners, the power of taxation gives public 
agencies a comparative advantage in controlling those who free-ride on nongame production.
2 
This advantage is amplified to the extent that a wildlife agency is designed to manage 
communities of species and service nongame constituencies.  
 
Some Empirical Evidence 
 
  To examine some of these tradeoffs empirically, one might regress landowner 
contracting costs and agency organization against private and public game and nongame 
management effort. While proxies for private management effort are unavailable, wildlife agency 
revenue and nongame spending data for each state are available for certain years in the 1980s 
and 1990s. For years corresponding with the dependent variables, separate cross data sets 
were assembled. For each state, the data include information about the average farm size and 
the percent of land in federal and state ownership. These variables proxy landowner contracting 
costs. Bureaucratic organization variables indicate the proportion of revenues that came from 
state general funds and whether the wildlife department was subordinate to a larger natural 
resource agency. Additional variables control for game and nongame demand and other 
economic and political factors.




  Wildlife agency revenue comes from various sources including hunting, fishing, and 
trapping license sales, wildlife license plate fees, wildlife-related merchandise sales, taxes on 
sporting equipment, private donations, and state general funds. For each year, regression 
analysis shows that the relationship between total agency revenue and average farm size was 
negative. Regression results also show that the relationship between agency revenue and the 
percent of public land was positive. Considered together, the above results imply that demand 
for agency management is greater when landowner contracting costs are high and when more 
habitat is in public ownership. 
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riders. 
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  For each year, regression analysis shows a negative relationship between revenue and 
subordinate placement. Because general funds are endogenous to agency revenues, I could 
not infer the effect of general funds on agency demand by regressing general fund dollars 
against total revenues. Separate empirical tests, however, indicate a fairly robust negative 
relationship between the amount of general funds received by an agency and revenues from 
license sales. Taken together, the above results imply that agencies more constrained by 
procedural rules and subjected to a wider range of constituent pressures will have trouble 
generating revenue - especially from user fee related sources. 
 
Table 1: Summary of Preliminary Regression Results 
  Effect on total  
agency revenue 
 
Effect on percentage of 
revenue spent on 
nongame 
Increase in average farm size  -  + 
Increase in percentage of public land  +  0 
Agency is subordinate   -  + 
Increase in reliance on general funds  na  + 
 
Spending on Nongame Species 
 
Most wildlife agencies established a program funded specifically for nongame (species 
not taken for food, fur, or sport) in the 1970’s. All states had such a program by 1989 (Edelson  
and  Curelean 1994). Nongame  programs generally began to research a single, high-profile 
species (Vickerman 1989), but now appear to be more focused on the goal of preventing the 
decline of all indigenous nongame wildlife (Richie and Holmes 2000). While the percentage of 
agency revenue spent on nongame programs has increased in most states since 1986, current 
figures vary significantly across states (Richie and Holmes 2000; WCFA 2001). 
 
Regression analysis shows a positive relationship between average farm size and the 
percentage of agency revenue spent on nongame. The findings imply that decreases in the 
landowner costs of managing game species will increase the relative demand for agency 
management of nongame wildlife. Regression analysis also shows that there is no relationship 
between the percent of public land in a state and the percentage of revenues spent on 
nongame. This finding suggests that more public land gives wildlife agencies a comparative 
advantage in both game and nongame management. 
 
 Regression analysis shows a positive relationship between agency reliance on general 
funds and the percentage of revenue spent on nongame. The analysis also shows a positive 
relationship between subordinate placement and the percentage of revenue spent on nongame. 
Considered together, these findings imply that agencies exposed to a broader range of 




  Private landowners with relatively large, contiguous, and homogenous parcels can 
overcome the contracting costs of managing transient wildlife, thereby reducing the comparative 
advantage of a wildlife agency. In light of this, state policymakers might think of ways to shift 
management responsibility (and residual claimancy) to landowners where appropriate. Efforts to 
do so are underway in many Western States. For example, Leal and Grewell (1999) chronicle   6
state-landowner partnerships that allow landowners to receive market hunting prices for 
accommodating wildlife.  
 
  The problem of efficiently managing wildlife is more complex in the case of nongame 
species. Values are dispersed among a greater number of not easily identified users. The power 
of taxation and consolidated ownership of a community of interacting species may give state 
agencies a comparative advantage in capturing values. Bureaucratic features more conducive 
to managing nongame, however, may come at the expense of more procedural constraints and 
vague objectives. Early evidence suggests that these constraints hinder a wildlife agency’s 
ability to generate revenue. Future research should critique this evidence by more explicitly 
evaluating the transaction costs involved with managing nongame and ecosystems compared 
with those associated with the traditional management of single game species. Extensions in 
this direction would necessarily consider agency interaction with the federal government. The 
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